It is well documented that longstanding focus on public health emergency preparedness medical countermeasures (MCMs) distribution and mass dispensing capabilities for mitigation of bioterrorism incidents and a lack of real-world opportunities to test national preparedness for large-scale emergencies has hindered development of a body of evidence-based practices in the United States.
To encourage jurisdictions seeking innovative opportunities for continuous improvement, we describe instances when the MCM capabilities were used to address smaller-scale, more-frequent public health emergencies such as disease outbreaks, natural disasters, or routine influenza vaccination. We argue that small-scale events represent a critical opportunity that state, local, tribal, and territorial entities can utilize for greater gains in MCM operational readiness than through exercises or planned reviews.
By using and evaluating MCM capabilities during a real response, jurisdictions can advance preparedness science and support the translation of research into practice, thereby increasing their capacity to scale up for larger, rarer, higherconsequence emergencies. (Am J Public Health. 2018;108: S196-S201. doi: 10 As a consequence, efforts to develop the nation's capability to dispense, manage, and distribute MCMs, as part of the PHEP cooperative agreements, have experienced fewer budget cuts than other preparedness activities. 1 While jurisdictions report increased levels of MCM distribution and dispensing capability, 1 studies have consistently found challenges in demonstration of MCM operational readiness despite the existence of developed plans. 1, 5, 6 With the rarity of large-scale bioterrorism emergencies and the rising frequency of natural disasters and international public health emergencies, 7 jurisdictions have progressively used exercises and rare, large-scale responses to infectious disease emergencies (e.g., H1N1 influenza pandemic response, Table 1 and Table A , available as a supplement to the online version of this article at http://www.ajph.org) to validate their MCM plans and, thereby, cultivate awareness of gaps and potential solutions. 4, 6, 8, 9, [12] [13] [14] [15] It is noteworthy that limited evidence in the literature suggests that some jurisdictions are capitalizing on the use of the MCM capabilities to respond to more frequent smaller-scale responses. 2 
MASS DISPENSING IN SMALL-SCALE RESPONSES
Our case studies and the tabulated examples highlight jurisdictions' use of the MCM capabilities and POD infrastructure to support dispensing or administration of MCMs in a variety of responses. Often situated in community centers or centralized large buildings, PODs may be accessible to the public (open PODs) or designed to exclusively serve pre-identified groups within locations such as schools, businesses, or hospitals (closed PODs). 4, 8, 12 Both open and closed PODs may be medical or nonmedical-the former staffed by clinicians capable of performing individual medical assessments in tandem with vaccine administration or dispensing MCMs, the latter staffed by lay personnel who are limited to dispensing MCMs.
The primary benefit of utilizing PODs is the high throughput at which mass prophylaxis and vaccination of large populations can be accomplished in contrast to an alternative method such as the use of health care sites, which have limited access and capacity. 4, 8, 18, 19 Although the use of PODs can facilitate provision of MCMs to a large number of people, the decision to use PODs in an emergency response depends on several factors, including, but not limited A total of 80 000 gallons of water were distributed throughout the response and 40 000 gallons were stored at the end of the operation. Increased awareness and compliance of state botulinum antitoxin protocol among health care providers and health department programs to ensure a coordinated and prompt request to CDC was needed.
The antitoxin was delivered to the state within less than 10 h of the federal decision to deploy. The ODH received the shipment into its centralized vaccine storage location and divided the doses on the basis of requests from 7 different health care facilities in the Columbus area.
The manufacturer's quick-thaw instructions were not written in plain language, which led ODH to develop a supplemental "1-pager" that guided uptake of the correct procedure at the individual facilities.
By midnight, the OSHP transported the initial botulinum antitoxin delivery from the state storage location to the health care facility that first alerted authorities about diagnosed patients.
The opportunity to use OSHP in the future for transport of small quantities of time-sensitive life-saving medications from state warehouses to health care facilities was recognized.
Of 29 people hospitalized at various facilities, 25 (86%) received botulinum antitoxin and 11 (38%) were intubated. After a week, 18 (62%) were discharged.
It was determined that better communication with health care facilities is needed regarding storage and handling of the product on site. For instance, some facilities refroze botulinum antitoxin, which damaged some of it.
The DSNS demonstrated its ability to rapidly deploy a large amount of botulinum antitoxin and transport this lifesaving MCM directly to a state receiving location.
The state MCM distribution plans facilitated the pre-positioning of OSHP units and the opening of a vaccine warehouse that offered access to cold-storage repackaging and shipping supplies. These capabilities ensured the rapid (< 2 h) botulinum antitoxin processing and shipment to the medical center with critical patients.
An LHD managed the transport of the other 6 requests by using nonemergency vehicles that were effective during this ongoing event.
Opioid epidemic response Access to naloxone is a focus area of the North Carolina Opioid Action Plan.
The product arrived at a state warehouse and the state's PHP&R staff quickly used CDC's Inventory Management and Tracking System software to generate chain-of-custody forms and packing slips.
Accurate and timely release of product was coordinated with more than 70 partner agencies and organizations that came from across the state to pick up their allotment for their communities.
The state's MCM receiving and dispensing capability was not fully leveraged for this event because of 3 key factors: (1) a lack of awareness of the capability of PHP&R across the state health department, (2) time constraints placed on the DMH to distribute the product, and (3) competing priorities.
It is possible that North Carolina will purchase more naloxone in the future and lessons learned from this distribution will allow for better coordination and communication and the ability to incorporate a future distribution into a statewide exercise to help strengthen this capability. to, the availability of MCMs, scope of the response, capacity of the existing health care system, the ability of law enforcement to provide security, and an adequate number of trained volunteers to staff the POD. 8, 18 The examples presented in Table 1 and Table A (available as a supplement to the online version of this article at www.ajph.org) highlight multiple responses in which using MCM plans and PODs increased timeliness and effectiveness of the response and garnered critical lessons learned that likely would not have been realized following exercises (e.g., race/ethnicity reporting to identify disparities, preidentifying a school contact with decision-making authority).
CASE STUDIES
In the following two case studies, innovative thinking enabled jurisdictions to solve response challenges considering advantages typically produced by the use of PODs.
Oklahoma Influenza Vaccination Campaign
In September 2016, the immunization program at the Oklahoma State Department of Health (OSDH) urgently needed assistance to distribute seasonal influenza vaccine throughout the state for its annual mass vaccination campaign. 20 The event was logistically unworkable because of a delay that prevented timely distribution of the vaccine by the state-contracted courier service to the local health departments (LHDs) that planned the community campaigns. Without distribution capability, the immunization campaign was to be cancelled. Aware of the situation, the Oklahoma state epidemiologist encouraged a collaboration between the state immunization program and OSDH Strategic National Stockpile team. The opportunity to solve a real-world public health problem, while testing their MCM plans, was evident.
By chance, concurrent with the intended vaccination campaign, the OSDH Strategic National Stockpile team planned to conduct a full-scale MCM exercise. The planned exercise was a means to test the team's ability to move materials to predetermined locations throughout the state while maintaining cold-chain integrity (maintaining appropriate cold temperature standards), a noted deficiency in a previous exercise. Because of collaboration between the state immunization program and the OSDH Strategic National Stockpile team, within two days of the planned cold-chain exercise, vaccine distribution to support the annual vaccination campaign was incorporated into the team's planned exercise.
In addition to promoting interdependency between these two state agencies, the incorporation of influenza vaccine distribution into the MCM exercise required maintenance of cold-chain integrity during transport of the vaccines. This collaboration enabled the distribution of 11 960 influenza vaccine doses to eight LHDs within 24 hours (which allowed them to be used in the planned vaccination campaign). In addition, the Oklahoma State Highway Patrol, which was interested in testing a new geographic information system or global positioning system, used the exercise to track the vehicles delivering the vaccine in real time and offered to provide this service in the event of future OSDH Strategic National Stockpile team distribution activities. On February 5, 2015, the Rhode Island Department of Health (RIDOH) declared an outbreak of meningitis at Providence College after two cases were identified among the student population. The cause was identified as a rare serogroup B meningococcal bacterial strain. 16 In response, RIDOH facilitated Providence College's acquisition of postexposure antibiotic prophylaxis for 71 students and mass vaccination with a newly licensed serogroup B meningococcal vaccine, on the basis of consultation with CDC and available guidelines. 16, 22 To expedite vaccination of 3745 eligible students, RIDOH leveraged and activated its incident command system and elements of their state's Medical Emergency Distribution System and warehouse plans, including MCM (antibiotic and vaccine) procurement, distribution, and vaccine administration using a closed POD (Brittan BatesManni, e-mail communication, December 8, 2017) . Three entities (Providence College, RIDOH, and the Rhode Island Medical Reserve Corps) coordinated closely on all elements related to POD planning and execution. On February 8, only three days after the outbreak was declared, these three entities cooperatively operated a mass vaccination POD in nine hours within the college's 45 000-square-foot recreation center to immunize 3061 students with the first dose of serogroup B meningococcal vaccine (Brittan Bates-Manni, e-mail communication, December 8, 2017). The Rhode Island Medical Reserve Corps provided the vaccinators. This was the largest number of people vaccinated in one day in a single location in Rhode Island. The college held a follow-up vaccination clinic on February 11 for the remaining unvaccinated students and supported a meningococcal carriage evaluation with CDC to measure the new vaccine's impact on carriage of the bacteria. 16, 17 Lessons learned. Communication was a central theme among lessons learned from the meningitis outbreak response (Brittan Bates-Manni, e-mail communication, December 8, 2017). First, engaging the college's emergency manager was integral to the establishment and operation of the POD on the campus and promoted similar relationships throughout the state's higherlearning institutions. Second, coordination of POD messaging, set-up, and throughput among the college, RIDOH, and Rhode Island Medical Reserve Corps proved challenging because of the lack of joint conference calls or colocated planners during the rapidly evolving response, which emphasized the need to establish a more effective tactical planning approach. Third, RIDOH provided 800-megahertz Rhode Island Statewide Communication Network radios for tactical communications, which did not work in all areas of the recreation center and were not programmed to overlap with channels used by RIDOH and Rhode Island Medical Reserve Corps staff. Thus, the need to test the available communications systems before POD activation was highlighted.
Furthermore, the new vaccine was shipped in prefilled syringes without needles despite verbal confirmations by the pharmaceutical representative that the needles would be included (which underscored a need for the RIDOH and other health departments to ensure visual inspection of the expected supplies before shipment). Also, development of an incident-specific medical history form and an algorithm for form reviewers helped to increase POD throughput. In addition, POD planners should have identified the entity responsible for submitting completed Vaccine Adverse Events Reporting System forms to CDC and the Food and Drug Administration in a timely manner. Finally, suboptimal planning for demobilization of unused vaccine resulted in the acquisition of refrigerators that were not designed for vaccine storage for the follow-up clinic. Appropriate refrigerators were secured, but this expense could have been avoided with full partner participation in the demobilization planning.
Impact. The provision of antibiotic prophylaxis to those exposed and rapid vaccination of 94% (3525 of 3745) of the eligible students with the first dose of serogroup B meningococcal vaccine helped to control the Providence College meningitis outbreak. 16 In addition, the POD supported an important rapid mass vaccination effort that permitted the RIDOH and CDC to evaluate the impact of serogroup B meningococcal vaccine on meningococcal carriage within this college student population. 16, 17 
CONCLUSIONS
These examples illustrate that smaller-scale responses have been effectively used to validate state and local public health emergency MCM operational capabilities. The empirical evidence gained by using the MCM distribution and dispensing capabilities in real responses drive continuous improvement and are a major experiential supplement to discoveries made under simulated conditions during exercises. 6, 18 The following observations are drawn from the examples presented in the case studies, Table 1, and Table A. First, experience gained either from previous exercises or from real responses instilled confidence in the jurisdiction's ability to operationalize the MCM capabilities in a real event. Access to critical resources, strategic relationships, and response plans enabled rapid decisions. Utilizing MCM capabilities during real events provided additional experience and magnified opportunities for improvement without the aforementioned limitations posed by scenariobased exercises. 7 Second, responding to a real event compelled participants to further characterize, prioritize, and solve outstanding gaps. For example, the meningitis outbreak case emphasized the value of partnership between the RIDOH and college emergency managers. As a consequence, the response increased RIDOH's connectivity with Rhode Island colleges to ensure a framework for stronger coordination during future public health responses on college campuses.
Third, communication and ongoing partnership development enabled successful responses. In the two cases, participants benefitted from real opportunities to utilize MCM capabilities and forge partnerships with epidemiologists, emergency managers, logisticians, surveillance staff, and others with whom they seldom interact as a result of compartmentalized working spheres. The impact of these critical partnerships is a philosophical shift from dependence on a single contingency model of dispensing to a dynamic and integrative system that is more readily adapted to meet the needs of the community served.
Fourth, the formal rigors of evaluation are necessary after a response. This point is emphasized by the tabulated examples, which illustrate significant gaps in evaluation strategies with respect to response efficiency and effectiveness. 4, 9, 12, 13, 15, 23 An evaluation of 26 North Carolina LHDs found that "most LHDs had no clear or common process to assess POD success or impact following a 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza school-based vaccination campaign." 15 One approach to addressing this challenge would be to engage partners across the health departments or academic institutions who can augment the capacity for operational research. 4, 8, 9, [13] [14] [15] Postresponse evaluation is critical to distinguishing what types of small-scale emergencies lend themselves to the use of PODs and identifying specific improvements required. 2, 6 Furthermore, evaluation results can demonstrate that a jurisdiction has met the criteria for advanced MCM readiness status on the basis of the CDC Operational Readiness Review that is required of PHEP recipients. Ultimately, evaluation is vital to identifying how the lessons learned from the use of MCM capabilities in smallscale responses can be scaled to apply to rare, catastrophic emergencies. 6, 7 
NEXT STEPS
The examples presented should encourage state and local entities to consider leveraging their MCM capabilities during responses to disasters, outbreaks, and vaccination campaigns to strengthen their capability to operationalize in large-scale events. Accordingly, health departments may consider the following to strengthen their MCM capabilities: (1) understand ways that MCM plans, especially those addressing PODs, have been and could be used to support nonanthrax events (especially events requiring vaccines given the additional logistical considerations); (2) document and publish an evidence base to foster continuous improvement; and (3) review evaluation strategies to identify opportunities for improvement. Accomplishing these three goals may be challenging because the documented observations resulting from exercises and incidents are typically decentralized in after-action reports and are of wide-ranging quality and accessibility to outside partners, which limits their usefulness to advance preparedness science. 6 Never- 
